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Abstract
Appointing a United Nations (UN) mediator to work in tandem with the United Nations Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP) in March 1964 led to fundamental shifts in how the UN Secretariat inner circle orientated the
organisation’s presence in Cyprus. The escalating crisis between the two communities in Cyprus and polit-
ical pressure from UN member states to respond before Cold War superpower nations became engulfed,
prompted the creation of UNFICYP and the recruitment of a UN mediator on 4 March 1964. This article
argues that the UN leadership intended to restore member state trust following the controversial Congo
mission (ONUC) and expand the organisation’s diplomatic agency through the innovation of deploying
the dedicated mediator alongside the armed mission. However, the success of the meditator was diplomat-
ically limited by the localised dynamics of the Cyprus conflict and the willingness of the Guarantor parties
to surrender their sovereign imaginaries of post-colonial Cyprus. Ultimately, the experiment in field-based
mediation forced the UN Secretariat leadership to acknowledge the incompatibility of appeasing all mem-
ber states on one hand whilst leading field-based political negotiations with the other.
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In the wake of member state criticism towards the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission to
Congo (ONUC) during 1960–1964, the international organisation weathered a ‘storm of criticism’
and ongoing financial difficulties, fostering an environment of anxiety within the UN Secretariat.1
The UN leadership worried that the Congo mission had significantly damaged its international rep-
utation and position within the international community, putting future UN diplomatic and peace-
keeping operations at risk.2 As outlined in the UN Charter, UN processes were intrinsically tied to
support from its member states through the donation of troops, financial aid and votes in favour of
extending peacekeeping mission mandates. Influential figures, such as the secretary-general U Thant
and other members of the Secretariat inner circle,3 believed that the organisation needed to
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1T. J. Hamilton, “U. N. Under Pressure: Financial Crisis and Criticism of Policy Beset World Organization,” The New York
Times, 11 February 1962.
2N. J. Padelford, “Financial Crisis and the Future of the United Nations,” World Politics 15, no. 4 (1963): 531–68.
3The UN Secretariat executive inner circle in 1964–1966 included: U Thant, Alexander MacFarquhar (Under-Secretary for
Personnel), Jose Rolz-Bennett (Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs), Chakravarthi V. Narasimhan (Under-Secretary)
and Dr. Ralph Bunche (Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs).
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re-establish its legitimacy following widespread international criticism of the institution’s efficacy
and trustworthiness in international conflict response. These concerns were heightened in early
1964 when the UN adopted new responsibilities in Cyprus. Organisational anxieties about the rep-
utation of the UN prompted the Secretariat leadership to innovate peacekeeping practices and
appoint a dedicated UN mediator to complement the activities of the armed peacekeeping force
in Cyprus (United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)) and negotiate a political settlement.
This article traces the personalised responses of the two UNFICYP mediators to these pressures
as they shifted between different mediatory approaches, more or less oriented towards external
states’ interests. It examines how their mediation activities made the organisation vulnerable to accu-
sations of partiality or exceeding the agreed remit of mediation, jeopardising the host states’ consent
for the mission as a whole. With mounting fears of organisational fragility and competition in the
sphere of diplomatic negotiations, local and international reception to UNmediation in Cyprus held
a strategic, procedural and political significance for those in the New York headquarters who hoped
that UNFICYP mediation would set a precedent for future UN field-based diplomacy.
By unearthing how UN peacekeeping staff attempted to navigate the Cyprus conflict in the
aftermath of ONUC, this article also demonstrates the centrality of UN peacekeeping missions
in making and remaking sovereignty during the era of decolonisation. UN peacekeeping missions
provided liberal internationalists a legitimate instrument to police the internal affairs of vulnerable
states and intervene in territorial disputes without invalidating sovereignty protections for pow-
erful nations. Liberal internationalism was a transnational vision that considered ‘the state’ as the
central unit of world politics. The UN Charter enshrined liberal internationalism as the political
norm within the organisation in 1945 as part of the organisation’s purpose as an instrument of
conflict prevention and democratic hegemony. Rather than being an ideology limited to diplo-
matic exchange within UN headquarters, state departments and embassies across the Global
North, the liberal internationalist vision was put into practice through UN peacekeeping missions.
This vision encouraged and entitled mid-level UN staff to use their authority within host states to
interfere in the political direction of the territory, perpetuate relationships with ex-colonial powers
and silence critical populations as practical experiments in the interests of liberal peacebuilding.
Thus, liberal internationalism manifested on the ground through peacekeeping missions as a form
of multilateral imperialism, with international UN staff making decisions that prioritised their
control of law and order and restoring ‘peace’ over the rights of host populations. UN staff
imposed, or attempted to impose, democracy onto decolonising and post-colonial territories in
order to control their trajectory towards liberal peace, believing that democratic states would
be less likely to engage in armed inter-state conflict. Thus, there was unequal respect for sover-
eignty at the heart of the peacekeeping project.
This unevenness was driven by the geopolitical position of a state within the international
order, differentiating national access to sovereignty. The UN Secretariat’s respect for sovereignty
was, therefore, underpinned by colonial models of civilisation and geopolitical inequality; a state’s
right to non-intervention was determined by its perceived geopolitical position until it reached a
certain ‘standard’ of liberal politics. As Adom Getachew has argued, ‘The protections that guar-
antees of sovereign equality and non-intervention afforded were unevenly distributed, making
new and weak post-colonial states vulnerable to arbitrary interventions and encroachments at
the hands of larger, more powerful states as well as private actors’.4 UN peacekeeping practices
during decolonisation ensured that liberal internationalism shaped the post-colonial international
order; sovereignty became, simultaneously, inviolable and violable (through multilateral interven-
tion) depending on a state’s geopolitical position and perceived value. From the field, mid-level
peacekeeping staff set the standards for ‘acceptable’, ‘credible’ or ‘stable’ nationalist politics or
leadership and paternalistically assumed a gatekeeping role of policing the ideological future of
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decolonising populations. Thus, in Cyprus, the inclusion and exclusion of political voices and
positions through UN mediation strategies helped to further entrench this transformation to
broader sovereignty processes; field-based international staff were on the front-line and at the
negotiating table as they helped to shape the design, politics and geopolitical allegiance of
post-colonial nations under the guise of conflict response.
Scholarship on Cyprus during the 1950s and 1960s has predominantly drawn on state archives
such as the British National Archive, Greek National Archive and American Presidential papers
held in the Library of Congress in Washington DC, thus focusing on Anglo-American represen-
tatives’ views and NATO security interests in the region.5 Building on this literature, this article
uses UN archival documents to re-centre UNFICYP staff in diplomatic histories of the conflict
and demonstrate the political role that the peacekeepers played in limiting the threat of
superpower intervention in the Mediterranean. The island had become a hotspot for Cold
War anxieties as Cyprus provided NATO countries a direct non-Arctic route to the Soviet
Union.6 Geographically, the island represented a meeting point between Europe and the
Middle East and was proximate to the Black Sea as well as NATO-aligned nations, especially those
within the newly constructed ‘Southern Flank’, such as Greece and Turkey.7 Post-Suez Crisis, the
British government was increasingly protective of their military bases on the island and the UN
leadership grew concerned about the lengths that NATO-aligned nations would go to in an
attempt to protect their strategic access. In a Security Council meeting in early 1964, Thant
emphasised the danger of the conflict to international peace and security and the catastrophic
ramifications if the island became the site of Cold War military aggression.8 The second
UNFICYP mediator, Galo Plaza, characterised the UN as crucial to not only the restoration of
peace in the ‘eastern Mediterranean area [but] possibly the world as a whole’.9
Historical attention to the UN has largely focused on examining the personalities and events
involved in the origins of the organisation as the victorious allies formalised their vision, interna-
tional norms emerged and lawyers and diplomats drafted foundational declarations.10 There are
two main approaches to the history of the UN during decolonisation. The first focuses on the UN’s
role as a diplomatic forum, a setting for member state instrumentalisation. These works argue the
General Assembly, and its supplementary committees, was crucial, if ambiguous, incubatory
spaces for international human rights and anti-colonial discourses. By examining different
5W. R. Louis, “Harold Macmillan and the Middle East Crisis of 1958,” Proceedings of the British Academy 94 (1997):
207–28; A. Varnava, “Reinterpreting Macmillan’s Cyprus Policy, 1957–1960,” The Cyprus Review 22, no. 1 (2010):
79–106; C. Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger (London: Quartet Books, 1984).
6J. Ker-Lindsay, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, 1963–1964 (Berkeley: Bibliopolis, 2009), 9.
7For more on the development of NATO’s “Southern Flank,” see D. Chourchoulis, The Southern Flank of NATO,
1951–1959: Military Strategy or Political Stabilization (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014).
8“Cyprus Crisis Goes To U.N. Today,” The Times, 17 February 1964; “Makarios Backed in Cyprus: Deepening of Conflict
Feared if His Proposals Are Rejected,” The New York Times, 2 January 1964.
9UN Archives (Henceforth UNA), S-0869-0001-10-00001, “Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the
Secretary-General, 26 March 1965,” 49.
10S. Wertheim, “Instrumental Internationalism: The American Origins of the United Nations, 1940–3,” Journal of
Contemporary History 54, no. 2 (2019): 265–83; A. Balasubramanian and S. Raghavan, “Present at the Creation: India,
the Global Economy, and the Bretton Woods Conference,” Journal of World History 29, no. 1 (2018): 65–94;
M. Sherwood, “‘ThereIs No New Deal for the Blackman in San Francisco’: African Attempts to Influence the Founding
Conference of the United Nations, April–July, 1945,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 29, no. 1
(1996): 71–96; A. Williams, “France and the Origins of the United Nations, 1944–1945: ‘Si La France ne compte plus, qu’on
nous le dise’,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 28, no. 2 (2017): 215–34; S. C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United
Nations (New York: Basic Books, 2004); D. Plesch, America, Hitler and the UN: How the Allies WonWorld War II and Forged
a Peace (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010); E. Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); E. S. MacKinnon, “Declaration as Disavowal: The Politics of Race and Empire in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” Political Theory 47, no. 1 (2019): 57–81; O. Hathaway and S. Shapiro, The
Internationalists: And Their Plan to Outlaw War (London: Penguin, 2017).
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factions within the UN, these scholars have drawn attention to the organisation as a principal
stage for diplomatic inter-state interaction during the twentieth century and emphasised the
organisation’s human rights credentials.11 This article takes a different tack, in line with a second
body of literature, which focuses on the field and operational practices of assistance during the
processes of decolonisation. This strand of historiography emphasises the individual decision-
making of UN staff, such as international civil servants, on shaping sovereignty norms and
state-building discourse during decolonisation.12 Their works forge a more complicated under-
standing of how international staff shaped post-colonial nationalism from the field in often unex-
pected ways, such as through international development projects and political consultation. By
tracing neglected or obscured sources of power within UN operations and revealing who directed
the technical, operational and political policies of the organisation, this article similarly draws
attention to the conflicting practices within the organisation’s bureaucracy as mid-level and head-
quarters staff attempted to repair the UN’s position in the international community through field-
based activities.
The invention of UN peacekeeping missions transformed the international organisation from a
functionally limited forum for inter-governmental debate into an important military and diplo-
matic agent in the field, and as such it played a constitutive role in shaping the post-colonial inter-
national order. This article highlights a paradox in UN field practices and its functional direction:
post-ONUC, UN staff were fundamentally reactive, attuned to issues of reputation and the urgent
operational demands of the mission. But, this myopic focus on ad hoc responses to the immediate
situation provided important, wide-ranging consequences to the future of peacekeeping. By exam-
ining the UN leadership’s decision-making whilst feeling ‘under threat’, this article highlights the
moment that organisational leadership reckoned with the incompatibility of the principle of host-
state consent and dynamic mediatory functions in the field.
The geopolitical conditions surrounding the UN’s intervention
The ONUC mission attracted international criticism and controversy throughout its operations
from 1960–1964, damaging the UN’s reputation (particularly with Afro-Asian nations) and spi-
ralling into a financial crisis for the organisation. In November 1960, the Afro-Asian People’s
Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) created a fund to counteract post-colonial nations’ economic
dependence on the UN and ensure autonomy from the organisation.13 Katherine McGregor
and Vanessa Hearman have argued that this fund was set up ‘because after the events of
Congo [Afro-Asian nations] no longer trusted the UN’.14 The kidnap and murder of Patrice
Lumumba and two of his colleagues by Katangan leadership and CIA officers in February
196115 further fuelled distrust in Afro-Asian nations and prompted international riots and
11J. Eckel, The Ambivalence of Good: Human Rights in International Politics Since the 1940s (Oxford: OUP, 2019), 136;
S. Moyn, “Imperialism, Self-Determination, and the rise of Human Rights,” in The Human Rights Revolution: An
International History, eds. A. Iriye, P. Goedde and W. I. Hitchcock (Oxford: OUP, 2012); M. Mazower, No Enchanted
Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009).
12G. Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); M. Terretta,
“‘We Had Been Fooled into Thinking that the UNWatches over the Entire World’: Human Rights, UN Trust Territories, and
Africa’s Decolonization,” Human Rights Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2012): 329–60; E. Muschik, “Managing the World: The United
Nations, Decolonisation and the Strange Triumph of State Sovereignty in the 1950s and 1960s,” Journal of Global History 12,
no. 1 (2018): 121–44; G. F. Sinclair, To Reform the World: International Organisations and the Making of Modern States
(Oxford: OUP, 2017); A. O’Malley, The Diplomacy of Decolonisation (Manchester: MUP, 2018).
13K. McGregor and V. Hearman, “Challenging the Lifeline of Imperialism: Reassessing Afro-Asian Solidarity and Related
Activism in the Decade 1955–1965,” in Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures,
eds. L. Eslava, M. Fakhri, and V. Nesiah (Cambridge: CUP, 2017), 171.
14McGregor and Hearman, “Challenging the Lifeline,” 171.
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protests against the ONUC mission. Outside the UN building in New York and across European
cities, demonstrators blamed UN leadership for failing to protect the Congolese Prime Minister.16
In February 1961, the Security Council authorised the expansion of ONUC’s military functions in
Congo and, by September, the mission leadership had launched Operation Morthor (Hindi for
‘smash’) to eliminate mercenaries from the southern region.17 However, the violence swiftly esca-
lated into open warfare once the ONUC troops seized control of Elizabethville, and
Hammarskjöld decided to personally mediate the situation.18 As Hammarskjöld travelled to visit
Tshombe in neutral territory, his plane was shot down by a Belgian mercenary near Ndola,
Northern Rhodesia, on 18 September 1961.19 The resulting shock and fallout within the UN
was felt on the ground within the ONUC bureaucracy as the ONUC troops struggled to contain
the violence in Katanga, threatening the stability of the nation and revealing the impotence of the
mission. Hammarskjöld’s death brought further instability to the organisation and attracted
greater international scrutiny to UN peacekeeping practices and military presence in Congo;
member states no longer trusted mission staff to make the ‘correct’ decisions or saw them as
experts in conflict response.
The Security Council’s appointment of U Thant in November 1961 prompted a shift in
ONUC’s approach from defensive to offensive and the mission expanded its military functions
once more, suggesting that Thant would be more reactive to the demands of the Afro-Asian bloc
than Hammarskjöld had been. However, from December 1961, the expense of the mission in
Congo became a source of criticism from multiple member states, in particular the United
States, as they criticised Thant for not being able to end the violence in Congo despite the
expanded mandate.20
With financial, geopolitical and military pressures mounting in 1962–1963, and the reputations
of Thant and the organisation at risk, intervening in another complex civil war with superpower
interests was initially low on the secretary-general’s agenda.21 Although the conflict in Cyprus was
fought between the island’s two ethno-nationalist communities (Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots),
the interests of the Guarantor Powers – Britain, Greece and Turkey – guided the island’s political
and sovereign future.22 Both communities in Cyprus struggled for independence from British
colonialism throughout the 1950s, and a stalemate in the counterinsurgency at the end of the
decade led to the creation of the Republic of Cyprus. However, the British government
16“Riot in gallery halts U.N. debate,” The New York Times, 16 February 1961; J. Feron, “U.N. takes steps to prevent riots:
Guards armed with clubs – arrests to be made in future demonstrations,” The New York Times, 17 February 1961; “Congo
issue stirs rioting in London: Police halt mob’s attempt to rush Belgian Embassy in Lumumba protest,” The New York Times,
20 February 1961.
17UN Doc., S/4741, S/RES/161, “Security Council resolution 161 (1961) [The Congo Question],” 21 February 1961.
18D. Halberstam, “U.N. takes Katanga,” The New York Times, 14 September 1961.
19Most recent evidence suggests that Hammarskjöld’s plane was shot down by a Belgian RAF pilot acting on behalf of a
Katangan mercenary group. See E. Graham-Harrison, et al., “Man accused of shooting down UN chief: ‘Sometimes you have
to do things you don’t want to : : : ’,” The Observer, 12 January 2019.
20T. J. Hamilton, “THE U.N.: Problems Over Goa, Congo and Finances Create New Crisis for World Organization,” The
New York Times, 24 December 1961; T. J. Hamilton, ‘U.N. Financial Troubles: Some Members’ Failure to Pay Share
Jeopardizes Future Operations,” The New York Times, 3 December 1961.
21A. Cooke, “UN’s debt collector faces hard task: Growing American criticism,” The Guardian, 6 March 1963; R. Scott, “UN
Advance went too far,” The Guardian, 5 January 1963.
22This argument has also been put forward in Arie Dubnov and Laura Robson’s edited volume which offers a transnational
history of partitionism. It situates the experience and interests of the British colonial administration at the centre of the social
and political conditions which facilitated post-colonial, sectarian partitions in Ireland, Pakistan and Israel. A. Dubnov and
L. Robson, eds., Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism (Palo Alto: Stanford
University Press, 2019); M. Given, “Maps, Fields, and Boundary Cairns: Demarcation and Resistance in Colonial Cyprus,”
International Journal of Historical Archaeology 6, no. 1 (2002): 1–22; E. Bouleti, “Early Years of British Administration in
Cyprus: The Rise of Anti-Colonialism in the Ottoman Muslim Community of Cyprus, 1878-1922,” Journal of Muslims in
Europe 4, no. 1 (2015): 70–89.
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orchestrated the post-colonial constitutional drafting process and used the transnational negotia-
tions in 1959 as a means of ensuring the retention of their Sovereign Base Areas on the island,
which had become strategically significant since loss of the Suez Canal Company in 1956.23
London andWashington officials regarded British control of the Sovereign Base Areas as essential
to the protection of NATO military interests in the Mediterranean region.24 The negotiations pro-
duced the London-Zurich Agreements or ‘the Treaties’ and were attended by representatives of
Britain, Greece, Turkey and Cypriot communities. These talks were instrumental in outlining the
constitutional quotas that would shape the political character of the newly independent nation and
which would eventually inspire an outbreak of inter-communal hostilities and violence across
Cyprus.
A precarious peace between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities was achieved during
these negotiations in 1960, but with the British administration no longer in power, the commu-
nities each conceived of the other as the political obstacle to their sovereign imaginaries: enosis
(union with Greece) for Greek-Cypriots or taksim (partition of the island into Greek and Turkish
sides) for Turkish-Cypriots. On 30 November 1963, Archbishop Makarios, leader of the Greek-
Cypriot community, publicly expressed his rejection of the new constitutional procedures as
he perceived the municipal quotas and tax laws as unfeasible.25 He announced his ‘13 Points’
for the functional and political improvement of the constitution, fracturing the precarious
post-independence stability and provoking inter-communal violence. Central to his demands
was a denunciation of the governmental quotas afforded to the minority Turkish-Cypriot
community within the constitution, prompting evacuation by many within the Turkish-
Cypriot community.26 Violence erupted across the country in what soon became known as
the ‘Bloody Christmas’ of winter 1963 as Makarios’ ‘13 points’ aggravated dormant prejudices
within both communities.27
The outbreak of violence was compounded by postcoloniality and the legacies of counterin-
surgency on the island. The memory of British colonial rule and conflict manifested in the
strategies that Greek-Cypriot forces used against Turkish-Cypriot citizens. In December 1963,
Greek-Cypriot police rounded up hundreds of Turkish-Cypriot civilians and held them hostage
in the same detention camps that the British had used five years earlier to hold Greek-Cypriot
resistance fighters.28 Turkish-Cypriot paramilitary groups were comparatively ill-resourced
and were unable to defend their community and places of worship from desecration.29
Misinformation and paranoia about the political intentions of each community spread between
regions, and paramilitary clashes stretched to coastal provinces, causing displacement in the
Turkish-Cypriot community and creating a humanitarian crisis.30 International Committee of
the Red Cross relief trucks began to distribute emergency food supplies and kerosene in
January 1964 as Turkish-Cypriot refugees travelled to Nicosia, the capital city, to escape the
violence in the villages and seek shelter.31
23R. Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954–1959 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 330–31.
24C. Nicolet, “The Development of US Plans for the Resolution of the Cyprus Conflict in 1964: ‘The Limits of American
Power,’” Cold War History 3, no. 1 (2002): 95–126.
25US Department of State, “293. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State,” Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Nicosia, 4 November 1963.
26Y. Ronen, Transition from Illegal Regimes under International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2011), 62
27C. Galatariotou, “Truth, Memory and the Cypriot Journey towards a New Past,” in Cyprus and the Politics of Memory:
History, Community and Conflict, eds. R. Byrant and Y. Papadakis (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012), 249.
28“Cyprus Violence Goes on as Isle Unifies Forces,” The Washington Post, 26 December 1963.
29“Turk Cyprus Shrine Damaged by Bomb; Tension Runs High,” The Washington Post, 24 January 1964.
30U. Keser, “Bloody Christmas of 1963 in Cyprus in the Light of American Documents,” Journal of Modern Turkish History
Studies XIII, no. 26 (2013): 265–6.
31L. Fellows, “New Cyprus Tension Imperils Reopening of Roads,” The New York Times, 9 January 1964.
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Although UN member states had discussed concerns about the colonial instability and inter-
communal violence of Cyprus on and off throughout the 1950s, it was not until the bloodshed in
December 1963 that the island became the focus of global attention.32 In a crowded diplomatic
arena, there were multiple inter-governmental forums with international conflict response func-
tions, meaning that the Guarantor Parties and Cypriot leadership could ‘shop around’ for the
organisation where they believed their political position would be best received. Makarios sought
to diversify the diplomatic actors involved in the international response to prevent the Guarantor
Powers – Britain, Greece and Turkey – from controlling the direction of the negotiations; a fear
connected to Greek-Cypriot political upset following the London-Zurich Treaties.33 Makarios
resisted persistent Anglo-American proposals for a NATO-led peacekeeping mission and
demanded that the UN Security Council authorises a peacekeeping force.34 Due to his networking
at the Bandung Conference in 1955 and Turkey’s perceived Western alliances, he was confident in
the support of the Afro-Asian bloc and the Soviet-bloc.35 Makarios insisted that the UN Security
Council was the ‘only appropriate international organ for the purpose’ and the greatest protection
a ‘small country’ could acquire ‘in the light of the various dangers which are involved in the pres-
ence of an international force’.36 The Turkish government was initially hesitant about this solution
as it had fewer allies in the UN than in NATO due to being a signatory to the Baghdad Treaty.37
However, the successful authorisation of the UN peacekeeping mission in the Security Council
resulted from a rare unanimous vote as member states cited their concerns about the global ram-
ifications of the Cyprus conflict if not contained.38
The innovation of Tuomioja’s appointment
Previous UN pursuits in formal mediation had been led exclusively by the secretary-general or
those within the UN Secretariat inner circle based in the New York headquarters.39 Following
the perceived success of then-secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld in releasing eleven kidnapped
American B-29 pilots during the Korean War,40 the motto ‘let Dag do it’ or ‘leave it to Dag’
32E. Johnson, “Britain and the Cyprus problem at the united nations, 1954–58,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History 28, no. 3 (2000): 113–30; E. Johnson, “Keeping Cyprus off the agenda: British and American relations at the United
Nations, 1954–58,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 11, no. 3 (2000): 227–55; S. G. Xydis, Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation,
1954–1958 (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1967); S. G. Xydis, “The UN General Assembly as an instrument of Greek
policy: Cyprus, 1954–58,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 12, no. 2 (1968): 141–58; D. Markides, “Britain’s ‘new look’ policy
for Cyprus and the Makarios-Harding talks, January 1955–March 1956,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth Health
23, no. 3 (1995): 479–502; H. Faustmann, “The UN and the Internationalization of the Cyprus Conflict, 1949–58,” in The
Work of the UN in Cyprus: Promoting Peace and Development, eds. O. Richmond and J. Ker Lindsay (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2001).
33J. A. Stegenga, The United Nations Force in Cyprus (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1968), 57–8; C. Dodd, The History
and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 45.
34J. Ker-Lindsay, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis (Berkeley: Bibliopolis, 2004), 53–65.
35J. Ker-Lindsay, “Europe’s Eastern Outpost: The Republic of Cyprus and the Middle East,” The Round Table 97, no. 397
(2008): 537.
36UN Doc., S/PV.1095, “Security Council official records, 19th year, 1095th meeting, 18 February 1964,” 22, paras. 124 and
126.
37Markides, “Britain’s ‘new look’ policy for Cyprus and the Makarios-Harding talks,” 482.
38A. James, Keeping the Peace in the Cyprus Crisis of 1963–64 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 41.
39The one exception to this was Count Folke Bernadotte who was UN mediator in Palestine during the UNTSO peace-
keeping mission in accordance with UN resolution 186 of 14 May 1948. He was assassinated in 1948 and replaced by
Secretariat official, Dr. Ralph Bunche, UN Doc., S/RES/57, “57 (1948). Resolution of 18 September 1948”.
40Brian Urqhart’s description of the crisis places Hammarskjold’s diplomatic weight as the primary reason for the successful
release: “In Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, Hammarskjöld was dealing with a fellow intellectual. In
an epic negotiation over the six following months, first the four fighter pilots were released. The crew of a B-29, with much
intelligence equipment on board the plane, took longer, but on Hammarskjöld’s fiftieth birthday, at a remote fishing village in
southern Sweden, he received Zhou’s telegram. The eleven B-29 crew members were on their way out of China and the
Journal of Global History 7
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1740022821000048
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Exeter, on 23 Mar 2021 at 14:24:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
became popular parlance within the international community to indicate confidence in his per-
sonal mediatory skills.41 Similarly, U Thant was a key mediatory figure in negotiations between
Washington and Moscow during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, according prestige to the
secretary-general from within the US State Department.42 Therefore, before UNFICYP, UNmedi-
ation efforts were highly dependent on the popular personality, international respect and profes-
sional weight of the person leading the negotiations. The UN secretary-general’s rank as the Head
of the UN Secretariat offered significant political and diplomatic authority, despite the instability
of the organisation, a valuable tool in international mediation. As the military functions of the
organisation expanded, the UN leadership invested in the development of the organisation’s
field-based diplomatic expertise. In 1964, Thant could not afford to devote himself to complex
negotiations requiring extensive consultations in several countries. Recognising that the
UNFICYP military operations and mediatory activities could work together to produce a peaceful
settlement,43 the secretary-general saw the activities of the UN mediator as integral to the
UNFICYP mandate, to ‘seek out a durable solution’ to the Cyprus question, and his plans to
broaden peacekeeping practices to include international diplomacy.44
The designation of a diplomat whose role was solely to focus on the mediation of the conflict
was, therefore, an innovation for the Cyprus mission. It divorced mediatory processes from the
political weight available to a secretary-general or inner circle diplomat, thus, requiring greater
focus on the negotiations producing solutions in and of themselves. Yet, finding an adequate
mediator proved tricky. Thant first looked within the UN Secretariat. Initially, Thant suggested
his colleague Jose Rolz-Bennett, a senior-ranked UN Secretariat civil servant, in March 1964.45
However, Rolz-Bennett was swiftly rejected by the Turkish government due to Turkish officials’
perception of his unfamiliarity with the region and lack of qualification for the task.46 Turkey’s
veto put Thant under pressure. He struggled to find a mediator acceptable to all the parties who
would also refrain from ‘prima donna’ behaviour.47 Although Thant had intimated that he was
hoping to have close oversight of the mediation process, Anglo-American diplomats expressed
concern, both to him and each other, and reminded him to avoid too great an involvement in
this ‘controversial and time-consuming assignment’.48 Reacting to the time pressure presented
by the emergency on the ground, Thant shifted his hiring practices to search externally to the
New York headquarters inner circle.49
By examining the biographical details and information relating to UN staffing and recruitment
selections, organisational biases and political intentions can be better understood. The first UN
mediator who was approved and assigned the role in March 1964 was Finnish banker, politician
and international diplomat Sakari Tuomioja.50 This appointment was praised by Makarios who
Chinese government sent its best wishes on Hammarskjöld’s fiftieth birthday.” B. Urqhart, “The Evolution of the Secretary-
General,” in Secretary or General: The UN Secretary-General in World Politics, ed. S. Chesterman (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), 20.
41R. Lipsey, Hammarskjöld: A Life (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 2013), 308.
42O’Malley, The Diplomacy of Decolonisation, 148.
43UNA, S-0869-0003-04-00001, “General Directive No 1 – 1964, from the Secretary-General to General Gyani,” 27 March
1964.
44UN Doc., S/5575, “The Cyprus Question: 186 (1964). Resolution of 4 March 1964,” 2.
45UNA, S-0079-0007-10, “CYE 26 Galo Plaza I - Draft of Section of Report to the Security Council on Question of
Mediator,” 11 March 1964.
46“Turks Reject U. N. Mediator,” The New York Times, 10 March 1964.
47US Department of State, “479. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State,” Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations,
5 March 1964.
48US Department of State, “479. Telegram.”
49S. P. Brewer, “U.N. Is Assured on Force To Keep Peace in Cyprus: Finland, Ireland and Sweden Confirm Commitment on
Troops,” The New York Times, 15 March 1964.
50UN Doc., S/5625, “Report by the Secretary-General on the Organisation and Operation of the United Nations
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus,” 26 March 1964.
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emphasised the importance of Tuomioja’s appointment as a non-state actor, rebuffing the US
State Department’s attempts to nominate a ‘leading American’ as an assistant to the mediator.51
Following an unsuccessful presidential bid in Finland in 1956, Tuomioja turned to leadership
positions within UN commissions and a ‘trouble-shooting’mission to Laos in 1959 before return-
ing to the Finnish Government to accept a series of international posts for the Foreign Ministry
until 1962.52 His reputation within the UN as chair of the Laos Economic Commission and an
experienced arbitrator qualified him, in Thant’s eyes, for the mediator role in Cyprus.53 Crucially,
as a Finnish national, Tuomioja’s appointment did not rouse any superpower objections. Once
appointed, Tuomioja focused on the international scope, interests and ramifications of the conflict
in Cyprus and the geopolitical impact of an expanded conflict in the Mediterranean. He organised
talks with Turkish, Greek and British representatives and, therefore, legitimised the continued
involvement of these Guarantor powers in the future sovereign character of Cyprus. During these
meetings, he began drafting reports to the secretary-general, covering details of his mediatory
activities on the island and his preliminary recommendations for conflict resolution. These reports
would then be published as a Security Council document, demonstrating to the member states the
multifaceted utility of peacekeeping missions and the diplomatic expertise of UN field-based
personnel.
Examining the mediatory processes during UNFICYP helps to reveal the voices unheeded,
unacknowledged in reports or uninvited entirely during these talks and, vitally, provides insight
into how Tuomioja hierarchised the value of the state representatives involved in the inter-
communal crisis. Although undertaking official and unofficial discussions with representatives
and individual citizens of Cyprus, Tuomioja’s mediatory strategy concentrated on facilitating
negotiations between the ‘three external governments [Britain, Greece, and Turkey] which have
been directly concerned with the problem of Cyprus’.54 Basing himself in Nicosia, Cyprus from
2 April 1964 until the end of May, Tuomioja spent a large portion of that time travelling to
Ankara, Athens and London, revealing where he believed a settlement would be meaningfully
sought. Following preliminary visits in Ankara on 17–18 April and 4 June, Athens on 26–27
April and 3 June and London on 30 April, 4 May and 12 June, he arranged for representatives
of these three governments to meet in the European Office of the UN in a series of intensive dis-
cussions, referred to internally as the ‘Geneva talks’, beginning on 5 July 1964.55 Tuomioja
recorded in his mediator report to Thant that the attendance of representatives from Greek-
and Turkish-Cypriot communities would only be arranged ‘as and when required’, further expos-
ing his belief that only an external solution to the crisis would be worth pursuing and entrenching
the disconnection of the Cypriot population from their political future.56 However, the Cypriot
leadership were willing and able to attend the ‘Geneva talks’. On 17 July 1964, Spyros Kyprianou,
Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Cyprus government, attended the Palais de Nations in Geneva
to meet privately with Tuomioja.57 The mediator’s prioritisation of the Guarantor Powers –
Britain, Greece and Turkey – was publicised in the UNFICYP magazine, The Blue Beret,
‘Having familiarised himself with the situation in Cyprus he judged it useful at this stage to
concentrate, in meetings in Geneva, on the views of the three [external] governments’.58
When discussing the arrangements for the ‘Geneva talks’ with the US State Department on
26 June 1964, Tuomioja commented that, although he accepted that the Cypriot representatives
51W. G. Blair, “Cyprus bars idea of a new advisor: Makarios’s Stand Rules Out U.S. Offer to Assist U.N.,” The New York
Times, 2 July 1964.
52“Mediator for Cyprus.”
53“Mediator for Cyprus: Sakari Severi Tuomioja,” The New York Times, 26 March 1964.
54UNA, S-0870-00001-01-0001, “Draft Report to the Secretary-General by the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus,” 73/74.
55UNA, “Draft Report,” 74/75.
56UNA, “Draft Report,” 74/75.
57UN Information Office, “Mediator Talks with Kyprianou,” The Blue Beret: UNFICYP Edition, 18 August 1964, 1.
58UN Information Office, “Cyprus and its Mediator,” The Blue Beret: UNFICYP Edition, 21 July 1964, 3.
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should not attend these talks, they could ‘perhaps be available somewhere nearby’ to avoid accu-
sations of excluding their views from negotiations. The State Department representative noted
that, ‘Mr. Tuomioja made clear he regarded this as window dressing at this stage’.59 The efforts
dedicated to ‘window dressing’ for the ‘Geneva talks’ suggested that Tuomioja had no intention to
include Cypriot leadership from either community in negotiations during his period as mediator,
but that he recognised the diplomatic value of the pretence.
However, American anti-Soviet foreign policy and suspicions of Tuomioja during these talks
resulted in an overt State Department presence and pressure on UN mediatory activities, remind-
ing the UN leadership of the potential for the Cyprus conflict to expand to global proportions.
The American representative at the Cyprus talks, Dean Acheson, regarded the mediator suspi-
ciously and described him as ‘a veritable phantom Finn’ due to his constant travelling from capital
city to capital city.60 Acheson devoted attention to assessing various plans for a political solution to
the crisis that would disadvantage the Soviet Union, regardless of the subsequent destabilisation of
the region. All diplomatic efforts exerted by the US government during this ‘crucial’ decade were
concentrated on the macro achievement of containing the Communist threat through micro-
managing political relationships in fragile regions across the globe.61 Telegrams from the
American Embassy in Athens to the State Department in Washington asserted that Tuomioja
was adopting a pro-Greek approach to the Cyprus dispute, stopping short of encouraging com-
plete enosis.62 This belief was also promoted in a CIA Briefing to the US President, Lyndon B.
Johnson, encouraging a sceptical attitude towards Tuomioja’s ‘quasi-federal’ plans for the island.63
The US government’s scepticism was especially glaring in appraisal of the mediator’s proposed
arrangement for Turkish-Cypriots whose territorial autonomy would be limited to ‘only five
or six regions’.64 In other reports, American diplomat Henry Labouisse indicated that the US
Mission to the UN, then led by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson II, had criticised Tuomioja’s
partiality. Labouisse argued that ‘a personal opinion favouring one extreme or the other : : : could
only serve to cause trouble at this juncture’.65
US efforts to police the UN mediator indicated a growing fear in the expansion of a non-state
actor’s political agency through the performance of mediation and, thus, cause a reduction of
influence for the American government. The US diplomats argued that the impartial ‘perfor-
mance’ of the UN mediator was crucial for successful negotiations; the mediator would balance
the other antagonistic positions and convey an active, yet not hostile, momentum to the discus-
sions that would be suspicious from a state, especially superpower, representative. The American
representatives were quick to remind the UN mediator that public knowledge of his partiality
towards a Greek-Cypriot majority form of federalism would damage the negotiating process,
despite US mediator Dean Acheson’s ‘Acheson Plan’ encouraging a not dissimilar solution to
Tuomioja.66 However, US officials’ expectations of a position of ‘impartiality’ in such negotiations
of political settlement and territorial sovereignty were incompatible with how the UN mediator
conceived of his role: an active negotiator, rather than a passive facilitator.
59US Department of State, “76. Memorandum of Conversation,” Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272N, 26 June 1964.
60US Department of State, “106. Telegram from the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State (Repeated to Ankara and
Athens),” Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP, 7 August 1964,
61D. B. Kunz, ed., The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations During the 1960s (New York, Columbia
University Press, 1994).
62US Department of State, “Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State,” Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1964–1968, Vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 8 June 1964.
63US, CIA, “Central Intelligence Briefing,” 9 May 1964, accessed July 18, 2019, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/
docs/CIA-RDP79T00975A007600450001-8.pdf
64US, CIA, “Central Intelligence Briefing.”
65US Department of State, “Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State,” Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1964–1968, Vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 8 June 1964.
66“Trip to Three Capitals, Focus of Optimism, Canceled – Acheson Presses Task,” The New York Times, 17 August 1964.
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Unexpectedly, in the midst of the ‘Geneva talks’ and drafting his report for the Security
Council, Tuomioja collapsed from a stroke.67 His surviving analysis of the talks is absent in
his posthumous report to the secretary-general, with the sentence ‘Paragraph to be inserted con-
cerning outcome of the Geneva talks’ acting as a stopgap in his drafted report.68 However, his
drafted recommendations clearly suggest that any amendments to the Cypriot constitution could
only be enacted ‘with respect for the international obligations : : : and in conformity with the prin-
ciples governing the procedure established by the constitution’.69 In simpler terms, he suggested
that the consent of the three external governments, whom he had invited to Geneva, should
remain integral to any sovereign configuration of the island. US records indicate that immediately
following Tuomioja’s collapse, Acheson attempted to assume a more authoritative position in
Geneva, despite Makarios rejecting his eponymous plan on 13 August.70 Acheson stepped in
and served as ‘principal go-between’ for the Turkish and Greek representatives until the
‘Geneva talks’ concluded on 1 September 1964.71 Although Tuomioja’s passing was reported
in The Blue Beret as a ‘cruel reverse’ to what had appeared to be a ‘ray of hope’ in the Cyprus
conflict,72 his The New York Times obituary recorded his non-state ‘presence’ as his contribution
to the talks rather than his unique ability as a mediator, yet even his presence at talks was report-
edly inconsistent.73 Acheson took advantage of Tuomioja’s death and briefly usurped the UN’s
position in the Cyprus negotiations, feeding into broader organisational anxieties and threatening
the status of the UNFICYP mediator. As Thant hastened to recruit a new UN mediator, he was
anxious to ensure that the organisation swiftly replaced its principal presence on the ground so as
to defend the UN’s status within the conflict and restore its reputation within the international
community.
The ‘Plaza moment’
Although Thant hoped for a smooth transition from Tuomioja’s interrupted negotiations, the new
UN mediator was determined to bring his own perspective and experience to the role. It was dur-
ing this period of institutional anxiety and vulnerability that Galo Plaza was appointed the new
UN mediator for UNFICYP on 16 September 1964. Following Tuomioja’s death in September
1964, Thant understood the importance of retaining the negotiatory momentum established in
Geneva and immediately obtained a replacement mediator who would be acceptable to
the Cypriot government as well as the three Guarantor Powers.74 He opted for Plaza,
Ex-Ecuadorian President and polymath. This choice was considered unsurprising by The New
York Times due to Plaza’s political experience, in addition to his previous employment by the
UN on field-based placements to Congo, Lebanon and Cyprus.75 At the time of his promotion,
Plaza was special representative to the secretary-general for UNFICYP and was thus familiar not
67Tuomioja’s meditator’s report was compiled by his legal and political advisers from his notes after he became ill: UNA,
S-0870-0001-01, “Letter from Robert T Miller to U Thant,” 28 August 1964.
68UNA, S-0870-00001-01-0001, “Draft Report to the Secretary-General by the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus,” 103.
69UNA, S-0870-00001-01-0001, “Second Draft: First Periodic Report to the Secretary-General by the United Nations
Mediator in Cyprus – Secret,” 54.
70“American Plan for Cyprus ‘unacceptable’,” Cyprus Mail 65, no. 6 (13 August 1964), 553.
71“Spinelli in Geneva Talks,” The New York Times, 22 August 1964; T. Szulc, “Acheson to Leave Deadlocked Talk on Cyprus
Crisis,” The New York Times, 1 September 1964.
72UN Information Office, “Secretary-General’s Press Conference Cyprus,” The Blue Beret: UNFICYP Edition, 25 August
1964, 3.
73“Sahari [sic] Tuomioja, U.N. Mediator In’ Cyprus Dispute, Dead at 53,” The New York Times, 10 September 1964.
74Temporary UN mediator, Pier Spinelli, Director General of the UN Office in Geneva, was appointed for the period
between Tuomioja’s withdrawal and Thant’s appointment of a new and approved UN mediator, UNA, S-0869-0001-13-
00001; “Spinelli Gets Temporary Post,” The New York Times, 19 August 1964.
75S. Pope, “Problem for Thant,” The New York Times, 18 August 1964; K. Teltsch, “Ecuadorian Given UN Cyprus Role,”
The New York Times, 12 May 1964.
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only with the Cyprus conflict but also the diplomatic burdens of the dual-mandate peacekeeping
mission. On accepting the role of UN mediator in Cyprus, Plaza considered himself, an
Ecuadorian, to be the correct choice, remarking at a 1964 press conference that, ‘as a Latin
American he felt he had a special understanding of Mediterranean problems’.76 In a quote for
The Blue Beret, he clarified that this ‘special understanding’ was because ‘ : : : he was of
Spanish origin and by ancestry a Mediterranean himself’ which made it possible, he said, ‘not
to believe in extreme positions’.77
Plaza’s mediatory processes contrasted with Tuomioja’s strategy as he chose to refocus on
Cypriot politicians rather than on the external Guarantor Powers. Plaza built upon his experience
and connections from his time as UNFICYP special representative which had given him the
opportunity to observe mission operations, meet with belligerent parties and draft reports for
the Secretariat from the mission headquarters in Nicosia.78 During that period, he was able to
introduce himself to Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders and elite community spokespersons,
enabling him to begin his role as mediator with a comprehensive understanding of the history,
politics and regional geography of the inter-communal conflict.79 In contrast to Tuomioja’s pro-
fessional preference to ‘mediate in comfort’ from Geneva,80 Plaza organised for the UNmediator’s
headquarters to be established in Nicosia alongside the UNFICYP base.81 He embarked on three
complete rounds of consultations with a range of official and unofficial community representa-
tives in Nicosia in addition to meeting with governmental diplomats in Ankara, Athens and
London.82 Following Tuomioja’s death and the transition to a vastly different mediation strategy,
international and local reception to Plaza’s personality and expertise became critical for UNFICYP
to maintain legitimacy and, more concerningly, consent to stay in the field.
During Plaza’s final round of talks, predictions of his recommendations began to circulate in
Nicosia and the Guarantor Powers, inflaming tensions and building expectations for his final
report. Telegrams between the US Department of State and the US Embassy in London in
February 1965 revealed concerns regarding what would be suggested in Plaza’s report.83
Additionally, the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk encouraged the Embassy in London to prepare
a unified Anglo-American front to whatever might be recommended in Plaza’s report.84 These
telegrams also confirmed that both Greek and Turkish governments were similarly anxious about
the nature of Plaza’s recommendations before the publication of the report.85 Newspapers
around the world reported on the rumours circulating about the report, building a crescendo
of transnational interest awaiting his official recommendations and the governments’ responses.86
76UNA, S-0869-0003-14-00001, “Press Release CYP/110: Secretary-General’s Special Representative Returns to Cyprus,
15 August 1964,” 104.
77UN Information Office, “Galo Plaza Returns to Cyprus,” The Blue Beret: UNFICYP Edition, 18 August 1964, 3.
78UN Doc., S/5671, “Report to the Security Council on the operations of the United Nations Peace-Keeping [sic] Force in
Cyprus’ 29 April 1964, Annex I, 2, paragraph 4; W. G. Blair, ‘U.N. Aide Reaches Cyprus,” The New York Times, 15 May 1964.
79W. G. Blair, “U.N.-Patrolled ‘Free Zone’ To Divide Foes on Cyprus: zone on Cyprus will divide foes,” The New York
Times, 8 July 1964; “Deteriorating Cyprus,” The New York Times, 20 May 1964.
80US Department of State, “Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at The Hague,” Central Files,
POL 27 CYP, 10 May 1964.
81UN Doc., S/6253, “Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General,” 26 March 1965, 3.
82UN Doc., S/6253, “Report of the United Nations”, 3–5.
83US Department of State, “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom,” Central Files,
POL 27 CYP, 25 February 1965.
84US Department of State, “Telegram.”
85US Department of State, “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom,” Central Files,
POL 27 CYP, 25 February 1965.
86“Mr Galo Plaza under attack again,” The Cyprus Mail, 5 March 1965; “Mediator report said to advice independence,” The
Cyprus Mail, 14 March 1965; A. Jacob, “M. Galo Plaza souhaiterait disposer d’une plus grande liberté de manœuvre pour
résoudre le problème de Chypre,” Le Monde, 4 March 1965; G. Artieri, “Blue Helmet,” Il Tempo, 4 March 1965.
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The mediator’s activities, by mixing rounds of local and international negotiations alongside
research for his report, reinforced excitement surrounding the unpredictability of his recommen-
dations and encouraged a sense of expectancy in Cyprus. Details of who Plaza spoke to, what was
discussed and the location of his negotiations were scrutinised by Anglo-American diplomats for
indications of what would be his suggestions for the political settlement of the island. This level
of oversight signified the perceived importance of Plaza’s report for not only those directly inter-
ested in the Cyprus conflict but also for parties anxious about the future politics of a non-state
mediator if this experimental position became a more permanent fixture to UN responses to
territorial disputes.
At the core of international concerns about the Plaza report was a concern about the mediator’s
suggestion that the involvement of external Guarantor powers in Cypriot politics should be
diluted. Until Plaza, the UN mediation policy towards the conflict was to perpetuate the colonial
practice of British or mainland nations’ interference in the politics of the territory, rather than to
consult with the newly independent population about how it imagined its post-colonial future:
‘My first concern,’ Plaza argued, ‘was to return the scene of mediation to the island of
Cyprus’.87 Plaza’s recommendations stated that the Guarantor Powers – Britain, Turkey and
Greece – should no longer be prioritised in the mediatory process and that the political opinions
of the Cypriot leadership population should be re-centred in negotiations.88 Tuomioja had
accepted the London-Zurich Agreement and the 1960 constitution and had used the
Guarantor Powers’ interests in the island as the foundation for his recommendations before
he passed away. Plaza’s decision to immediately change tack and announce that, ‘the very fact
that a Mediator had been appointed was proof that a new solution had to be found’, also con-
cerned other state actors, such as the Turkish government, which intended on retaining its inter-
ests on the island.89 In his report, Plaza’s focus on the ‘final solution’ of the Cyprus Force mission
and his rejection of the London-Zurich Agreement in his 1965 report gave him a more radical
stance than Tuomioja, threatening established legal and diplomatic ties between the Guarantor
powers and the island.90
Before Plaza had finished writing his report, Thant developed a diplomatic and security strat-
egy to control the release of the document, indicating that he was wary about a potential surge in
violence on the island and in the surrounding region. The stakes of this reputational and military
risk to publish publicly in the Security Council, whilst aware of the various state interests centred
on the island, demonstrate Thant’s willingness to gamble the precarious ceasefire on the island for
an attempt to restore the reputational value of the organisation. Following six months of meetings,
travelling and negotiations, Plaza’s 66-page report finally arrived on Thant’s desk on 26 March
1965.91 Thant instructed the UNFICYP Force Commander, General Thimayya, to take prepara-
tory security measures on the island in order to anticipate any negative local reactions. To facilitate
this function, the secretary-general sent the UN special representative and General Thimayya an
advance copy of Plaza’s report as part of a confidential ‘pouch’ delivered to Nicosia.92 Thant also
ensured that the Cypriot leaders and Guarantor Powers received the report over the weekend of
the 27 and 28 March 1965,93 anticipating that these governments would require the extra time to
construct formal diplomatic responses to the report before it was published as an official Security
87UNA, S-0869-0001-10-00001, “Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General, 26 March
1965,” 38.
88UNA, “Report of the United Nations Mediator,” 38.
89UNA, S-0869-0001-09-00001, “Notes on Galo Plaza Conference, 25 September 1964,” 17.
90UNA, S/5691, “Report on the organization and operation of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus,” 11 May
1964, 1.
91UN Doc., S/6253, “Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General,” 26 March 1965.
92UNA, S-0869-0001-10-00001, “Suggested Action for the Transmission of the Mediator’s Report,” 22 March 1965, 4.
93“Cyprus Mediator Urges Talks Now,” The New York Times, 28 March 1965.
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Council document on 30 March 1965.94 Thant also prepared to transmit advance copies of unof-
ficial sections of the report to member states of the Security Council ‘for their confidential infor-
mation’ on 29 March.95 To the published Security Council document, Thant attached an
endorsement note but emphasised that Plaza’s report was not meant to be the conclusion to nego-
tiations; Plaza had plans to return to Cyprus in one month’s time to continue consultations and
put ‘himself at the disposal of the parties in any way he may usefully serve’.96 Short sections of the
report were later published in The Blue Beret in the 7 April 1965 edition, broadcasting the report to
the UNFICYP troops and administrative personnel.97 Staggering the release of the Plaza report
may have been an attempt by Thant to pre-empt escalatory reactions and to retain control of
the information. However, while Thant delayed the public distribution of the report in the
Security Council, Athens-based and pro-Greek newspaper, Eleftheria, printed extensive details
and excepts from the leaked report on 28 March.98 These quotes were swiftly dispatched to
the international media, drawing global attention to the reactions of the governments involved
and dispelling any deescalating efforts by Thant to stagger its release – and, therefore, responses.
These reactions to the Plaza report illustrate the significance of the international organisation in
shaping the evolving processes of post-colonial sovereignty and territorial disputes during this era
of geopolitical transformation. UN peacekeeping staff’s opinions directly impacted on the political
debates of the nation future, making – and remaking – norms and turning international discourse
to UN-identified recommendations.
Backlash to Plaza’s report
Wrapped up in the potential of the Plaza report to provide a meaningful solution to the Cyprus
conflict were hopes within the UN bureaucracy for a reputational boon. In the aftermath of
ONUC, a financial crisis and ongoing member state criticism, those within the UN Secretariat
anticipated that Plaza’s recommendations could help to recast the organisation as a locus of
diplomatic expertise and reflect well on the UNFICYP mission. Internally, senior UN officials
pronounced the report as ‘brilliant’ to Guardian reporter Hella Pick.99 However, these officials
also emphasised that they were aware of the complicated nature of the political context in
Cyprus and thus they were reportedly ‘sanguine’ that any of Plaza’s perceived wisdom would
be transformed into a practical solution.100
To the chagrin of the UN Secretariat, the Greek and Turkish governments held opposing
responses to the report, provoking further conflict on the island as the two communities were
once more divided. Political opinion on the Plaza report became bound with sectarian meaning,
and both communities stood polarised on Plaza’s continuation as UNFICYP mediator. The
Greek-Cypriot representative Glafcos Clerides, President of the Cypriot Parliamentary House
and advisor to Makarios, was the first politician to make an official comment on Plaza’s report,
and he reacted positively to the recommendations. In an article in the Cyprus Mail on 1 April
1965, Clerides’ is quoted promising to, ‘give careful consideration to the report of the UN
94The date of the distribution of the official Security Council report is disputed among scholarship on Cyprus. 30 April 1965
is reported in The Blue Beret: UNFICYP Edition as the date that the document was released and so this is the date accepted by
the author: UN Information Office, “Mediator recommends early meeting of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities
– ‘procedure most likely to produce fruitful results’,” The Blue Beret: UNFICYP Edition, 7 April 1965, 4.
95UNA, S-0869-0001-10-00001, “Suggested Action for the Transmission of the Mediator’s Report,” 22 March 1965, 4.
96UNA, S-0869-0001-10-00001, “Suggested Action for the Transmission of the Mediator’s Report,” 22 March 1965, 4.
97UN Information Office, “Mediator recommends early meeting of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities –
‘procedure most likely to produce fruitful results’,” The Blue Beret: UNFICYP Edition, 7 April 1965, 4.
98“Cyprus Mediator Urges Talks Now,” The New York Times, 28 March 1965.
99H. Pick, “Two sides urged to meet in Cyprus: Senor Galo Plaza’s report,” The Guardian, 31 March 1965.
100H. Pick, “Two sides.”
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Mediator : : : ’ and describing it as a ‘bold and welcome’ report.101 The Greek Government con-
curred, stating that ‘the continuation of Mr Plaza as Mediator would be an essential condition for
the solution of the Cyprus problem’.102 Although the Greek Government complained that the
report did not accept enosis as the solution to the conflict, largely politicians in Athens seemed
to accept Plaza’s recommendations as a starting point for future negotiations.103 In stark contrast,
the Turkish Government and Turkish-Cypriot leadership’s public response to the report was to
accuse Plaza of abusing of his mediatory jurisdiction and producing a pro-Greek-Cypriot
document.104 Orhan Erlap, Turkish Ambassador and Ambassador to the UN, called for
Plaza’s resignation for ‘going beyond [the] terms of reference specified in the 4 March 1964 reso-
lution of the Security Council’.105 Thant promptly defended Plaza’s report in a message to Turkish
Ambassador Erlap,106 but the damage to Plaza’s reputation was permanent as they pressed Thant
to fire the mediator.107 Turkish-Cypriot representatives echoed Ankara’s rejection of the report.
For instance, Fazıl Küçük, Turkish-Cypriot leader and Vice-President, argued that the conflict was
mainly related to the political problems between Greece and Turkey, thus rejecting Plaza’s con-
tention that the scene of mediation efforts should be concentrated on the island of Cyprus.108
Küçük maintained that a lasting solution could only be reached within the context of Greco-
Turkish-led negotiations.109 Later in 1965, Rauf Denktaş, Turkish-Cypriot politician, spoke at
the Security Council and described the Plaza report as ‘a shield for the [Greek] ulterior motives’.110
The international response to the dogmatism of the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot governments
was disbelief, especially as Plaza had indicated his hopes to return to the island in a month and
revise his initial recommendations in line with national reactions.111 NATO allies criticised
Turkey for the vehemence of its reaction as many believed that Ankara’s rejection of the report
seemed to be a transparent strategic move.112 The US Department of State privately supported the
majority of Plaza’s suggestions and internally vented its frustrations with the Turkish government
for its response to Plaza’s report, ‘At the moment it is difficult to find any thread of rational strat-
egy in their conduct. The purely negative position they have taken is not good enough’.113 The
State Department’s position, however, was limited, and they concluded that their role should
remain to, ‘encourage intensification GOT-GOG [Government of Turkey-Government of
Greece] contacts’ and hope for a ‘final solution’ through the state actors involved in the conflict.114
The dispute over the mediatory personnel on the ground provided another opportunity for the
101“Clerides calls for ‘careful thought’: ‘End to wishful thinking’, Cyprus ‘at threshold of momentous decisions,” Cyprus
Mail, 1 April 1965.
102UNA, S-0869-0001-10-00001, “Clipping:New York Times, ‘Turkish Cypriots Cool to UN Plan’”, Friday, 2 April 1965, 76.
103UN Doc., S/6280, “Letter dated 8 April 1965 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece addressed to the Secretary-
General,” 9 April 1965.
104V. K. Fouskas and A. O. Tackie, Cyprus: The Post-Imperial Constitution (London: Pluto Press, 2009), 43; “Turkish
Cypriots Cool to UN Plan,” The New York Times, 2 April 1965.
105UNA, S-0869-0002-04-00001, “Letter from Erlap, Turkish Permanent Mission to the UN to U Thant, 31 March 1965,” 10.
106UN Doc., S/6267, “Exchange of letters between the Permanent Representative of Turkey and the Secretary-General
regarding the report of the United Nations Mediator in Cyprus,” 2 April; S. Pope, “Cyprus Mediator Backed by Thant:
UN Leader says Turkey’s move against Plaza could wreck settlement hopes,” The New York Times, 3 April 1965.
107UN Doc., S/6279, “Letter dated 3 April 1965 from Dr Fazil Kuchuk addressed to the Secretary-General,” 9 April 1965.
108UNA, S-0869-0001-10-00001, “Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General, 26 March
1965,” 38.
109UN Information Office, “U Thant continues to back Plaza,” The Blue Beret: UNFICYP Edition, 21 April 1965, 6.
110R. Denktash, “Speech Two: 5 August 1965,” in Rauf Denktash at the United Nations: Speeches on Cyprus, ed. M. Moran
(Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 1997), 142.
111UNA, S-0869-0001-10-00001, “Draft letter from the Secretary-General to the parties concerned,” n. d., 4.
112UNA, S-0869-0001-10-00001, “Clipping: The Washington Post, “The UN and Cyprus”, Wednesday, 7 April 1965,” 77.
113US Department of State, “186. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Tehran, 6 April
1965,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-68, Volume XVI, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey.
114US Department of State, “187. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, 9 April 1965,” Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964–68, Volume XVI, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey.
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Guarantor Powers, in particular the Turkish government, to stymy any political solution to the
conflict that had not been orchestrated with its interests in mind.115 The shock of the Turkish
government’s ‘prompt and unexpected rejection of Mr Plaza’s report’ reverberated around the
globe as it appeared to other interested states that this rejection of Plaza would disqualify the
meditator from returning to the island and potentially jeopardise the future of the UNFICYP
mission.116
The consequences of the Turkish government and Turkish-Cypriot representatives’ reaction to
the report ricocheted further than the diplomatic circles of NATO as UNFICYP troops reacted to
the international response and braced themselves for military repercussions on the ground.
In Nicosia, peacekeepers’ letters and articles published in the troop magazine, The Blue Beret,
emphasised their anxieties regarding the ability of Plaza to overcome the criticism of the
Turkish-Cypriots and return to his position in Nicosia, threatening unknown consequences
for those deployed to the dual-mandate mission.117 The Secretariat leadership had designed
the mission to pursue both military and mediatory objectives, conceiving of them working in tan-
dem together to support the settlement of the conflict. Without a functioning UN mediator, how
could the UN peacekeeping mission withdraw from the island with a completed mandate?
Thant refused to dismiss Plaza for a report that he had ‘found nothing in : : :which could I
could consider as going beyond the functions of the Mediator as defined’.118 Despite the contro-
versy, Thant requested that Plaza remain in the mediatory role until the next General Assembly
meeting in December,119 although absent from Nicosia, and available to the parties for further
consultation if requested.120 However, Plaza recognised that continuing as mediator with the per-
ception of unprofessionalism from two of the central parties, Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot
leader, to the conflict would be a Sisyphean task.121 Plaza’s report remained at the centre of debates
about the ‘Cyprus Question’ within the UN deliberative forums for the rest of the year, and it was
re-distributed as a General Assembly document in late September 1965 at the request of the UN
Permanent Representative of Cyprus, Zenon Rossides.122 Once the General Assembly discussions
on 18 December 1965 failed to dislodge the Turkish government’s position and reveal ‘the hidden
motivations which stand in the way of any efforts at mediation’, Plaza submitted his resignation
letter.123 The Greek representatives publicly agreed with Turkey’s demand for separate Greco-
Turkish talks on the conflict, and Plaza recognised that remaining in the role would ostracise
the UN from any future negotiations.124
Although Plaza left the role, his period as UN mediator helps to illuminate the influence of
mid-level UN peacekeeping staff in impacting on post-colonial discourse and issues of territorial
sovereignty despite limited room to manoeuvre. Plaza’s personalised mediation strategy of
extensive travel and international consultation contributed to a sense of expectation as a political
solution appeared possible. He reoriented the geography of international mediation to Nicosia
rather than London, Ankara or Geneva, thus using the UN’s peacekeeping presence in Cyprus
115In the aftermath of Turkey’s rejection of the report, Ankara threatened to invade Cyprus. A dispatch from The Times in
London to The New York Times reported, “In the last few days since Turkey’s abrupt rejection of a report submitted by the
United Nations Mediator for Cyprus, Galo Plaza Lasso, there has been rising anti-Western feeling in Turkey combined with
bitter criticism of Greece. The Turks feel let down by the West over Cyprus, ‘Turks’ Intervention in Cyrus is Hinted,” The New
York Times, 9 April 1965.
116“Greeks will confer on report by Plaza,” The New York Times, 4 April 1965.
117UN Information Office, “U Thant continues to back Plaza,” The Blue Beret: UNFICYP Edition, 21 April 1965, 1, 6.
118W. Fulton, “Thant Spurns Turk Please to Fire Mediator,” Chicago Tribune, 3 April 1965.
119UNA, S-0869-0001-09-00001, “Letter from U Thant to Mr G Plaza,” 16 June 1965, 27.
120UN Doc., S/7001, “Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus,” 7 December 1965, 52.
121G. Plaza, “Interview with President Galo Plaza by Diego Cordovez,” United Nations Digital Library, 28 March 1984, 6.
122UN Doc., A/6017, “Question of Cyprus: Letter dated 27 September from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” 27 September 1965.
123UNA, S-0869-0001-09-00001, “Letter from Mr G Plaza to U Thant,” 11 March 1966, 30.
124“Plaza Resigns UN Post as Mediator in Cyprus,” The New York Times, 10 January 1966.
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to encourage the devolution of diplomatic spaces and to have greater political significance to the
population to which the talks relate. Rolz-Bennet wrote a letter to Plaza following the publication
of his report indicating the benefit Plaza’s efforts on the momentum of a potential solution, stat-
ing, ‘Your report has dramatised the need and urgency of such negotiations, and by the impact has
made, has improved the prospect of bringing them about. In this respect, it has achieved its pri-
mary objective of dislodging the Cyprus problem from its “dead centre”.’125 Recognising the prob-
lem of stagnation like many other humanitarian organisations,126 the UN leadership was faced
with the decision of remaining on the ground and taking on a passive facilitator role or to with-
draw their presence and risk the resurgence of violence across the island.127
Initially, the role of UN mediator in Cyprus was left open following Plaza’s resignation, reflect-
ing the UN Secretariat’s lack of direction on the Cyprus Question during the mid-1960s. Michael
Harbottle, Chief of Staff for the Cyprus Force mission in 1966-1968, recorded in his 1970 memoir
that this period represented a peak in hopelessness for the UNFICYP staff. He commented that,
‘On the political side, matters were at an even greater standstill and no glimmer of light was visible;
if anything the political scene by the middle of 1965 was probably as gloomy as it could be’.128
In February 1966, Thant sent Secretariat official Rolz-Bennett to the Mediterranean region to
scope the receptibility of the interested parties in the UN deploying a new mediator. He was also
sent to keep the diplomatic channels of communication open with leaders in Cyprus, Ankara and
Athens, whilst UNFICYP was still on the ground.129 Following these visits, Rolz-Bennett’s
reported to Thant that, ‘the prospects of appointing a new Mediator are very dim, to say the
least’.130 Harbottle also believed that ‘mediation had gone out of the window, at least for the time
being, and both Governments of Cyprus and Turkey, for very different reasons, opposed the
appointment of a new Mediator’.131 The damage to the UN’s operational reputation was severe
and, for the Secretariat inner circle, the immediate concern was regaining the trust of the Cypriot
leaders and Guarantor Powers and maintaining UNFICYP activities on the island by refocusing
on the military mandate of the mission.
Steps to undo the mistrust between state actors and the UN representatives in Cyprus and
rebuild negotiations, shifted the organisation’s strategy to re-prioritise the interests of external
state representatives in Athens and Ankara. On 2 March 1966, Thant extended the duties of
his special representative to UNFICYP, Carlos Bernardes, to include the use of UN ‘good offices’
in talks with the belligerent parties, thus condensing the full-time UNFICYP mediator’s dedicated
activities into additional responsibilities for an existing official.132 Bernardes’ expanded functions
maintained space for UN personnel to participate, if in a limited sense, in relevant talks.133
On 9 May 1966, Bernardes visited Ankara and began consultations with the Turkish government
and then flew to Athens directly on 12 May to continue his efforts in Athens. Shifting from Plaza’s
engagement with formal and informal representatives of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communi-
ties, Bernardes believed that Greco-Turkish talks would result in a resolution to the conflict
between the two communities. In response to the demands of the Turkish and Greek governments
for separate talks, Bernardes’ actions delivered a ‘mortal blow’ to the surviving suggestions made
125UNA, S-0079-0007-10, “CYE 26 Galo Plaza I: Letter to Plaza, 14 April 1965”.
126F. Terry, Condemned to Repeat?: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).
127UNA, S-1070-0030-01, “Secretariat survey team to Cyprus: Confidential internal memo – Forthcoming Review by the
Secretary-General of the Situation in Cyprus,” undated 1969, 6.
128Harbottle, The Impartial Soldier, 55.
129UNA, S-0869-0001-11-00001, “UN Internal Memo, Cyprus Mediation, 2 February 1966,” 3.
130UNA, S-0869-0001-11-00001, “Cable from Rolz-Bennett to U Thant, Report of Talks in Ankara and Athens on Cyprus,”
24 February 1966, 8.
131Harbottle, The Impartial Soldier, 56.
132UN Document, S/7180, “Note by the Secretary-General,” 4 March 1966.
133UN Document, S/7180, “Note.”
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in Plaza’s report.134 The Turkish government’s response to Plaza’s report had highlighted the
political vulnerability of the UN’s presence and participation in conflict resolution. UN mediatory
attention refocused on the potential political solutions offered by the mainland state actors rather
than those from the Cypriot population, reinstalling the island’s political representatives as
‘window dressing’ for Guarantor Powers’ negotiation.
In the years following the ‘Plaza moment’, UN practices adapted to reassert and legitimise the
importance of external state actors in the peace process on the island. A memo recorded by
Rolz-Bennett stated, ‘These misgivings [about stagnation] have been aggravated by the
well-known experience of the Mediator, and more profoundly, by its significance for the general
accepted principles of United Nations mediation. The mediation process has been proved capable
of being stultified by the particular attitude of a single party to the dispute’.135 Therefore, the state
and organisational reactions to the ‘Plaza moment’ dislodged the centrality of UN personnel in
Cyprus peace negotiations, transforming the character of the UNFICYP presence on the ground.
This moment demonstrated how swiftly a key function of the UN peacekeeping mandate could be
immobilised and pacified through state criticism. The same reputational anxiety that motivated
Thant to expand the functions of the UN peacekeeping mission also provoked him to reorientate
the UN mission’s mediatory scope after Plaza’s resignation. By 1967, UN mediation activities in
Cyprus had devolved from being a proudly central function of the organisation’s field-based oper-
ations, in collaboration with the 7,000 strong military effort, to a curtailed and side-lined process,
an additional duty for an existing mid-ranking official.
Conclusion
This article has argued that state and institutional reactions to UN mediator Plaza’s report caused
a fundamental shift in the orientation of peacekeeping practices in the field. It has also illustrated
the influence of UN peacekeeping staff in making and remaking sovereignty norms as the UN
mediator navigated the grey area of political negotiations during an ‘impartial’ UN peacekeeping
mission. The ‘Plaza moment’ highlighted the incompatibility of the organisation’s efforts to simul-
taneously pursue military and diplomatic activities within such a politically complex conflict.
As UN officials travelled around Europe to consult and make recommendations with different
political leaders, they shaped the post-colonial discourse on Cypriot independence and national
identity. Mediators’ choices of who to consult, who to exclude and who to invite for ‘window
dressing’ informed international conceptions of the conflict and had political ramifications for
the Cypriot population.
By shedding light on the anxieties and priorities held by influential UN figures in the aftermath
of the ONUCmission, this article has provided insight into the evolving perceptions and functions
of the organisation through peacekeeping missions during the Cold War and the organisational
fixation on repairing its reputation through experiments in field-based operations.
In reaction to international criticism and climbing debt post-ONUC, the UN leadership deter-
mined that recruiting a mediator for UNFICYP would enhance their efforts to revive their repu-
tational in the field of conflict response. The international politics of the Cold War complicated
this intention, and the UN leadership openly acknowledged the complexities of the civil war.
By emphasising the stakes of the deployment, UN officials attempted to highlight courage of
the organisation to undertake such a task, hoping that the international community would respect
the ‘do what needs to be done’ humanitarian bravado. Thant publicly assessed that UNFICYP
personnel were operating in ‘the most delicate position that any UNmission has ever experienced,
for it is not only in the midst of a bitter civil war, but it is dangerously interposed between the two
134“Greco-Turkish talks urged on Cyprus,” The Guardian, 13 May 1966.
135UNA, S-0079-0007-09, “CYE 25 Aide-memoire – Jose Rolz-Bennett’s trip: Draft Aide Memoir,” 5 November 1966, 1.
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sides of that war’.136 However, the expansion of the organisation’s mediatory capacity to a
dedicated mediator as part of an armed mission made the institution vulnerable to accusations
of partiality, threatening the viability of the mission and contravening the organisation’s founda-
tional principles.
Interventions made by the US State Department when Tuomioja fell ill spoke to the political
significance of expertise in territorial disputes during this transformative era as the mediation
marketplace increasingly expanded to include non-state representatives. However, the UN leader-
ship’s decision to publicly distribute the Plaza report through the Security Council, rather than
through more discreet channels or formal negotiations, made the UN leadership appear naïve to
the delicate demands of international diplomacy rather than as a locus of expertise, especially
following the reaction of the Turkish government. The decision to dilute the mediation function
of the UNFICYP mission exposed the UN leadership’s procedural and political vulnerability
during this period of institutional fragility and geopolitical insecurity as they desperately sought
to secure the UN’s position within the international community.
Revisiting the ‘Plaza moment’ allows for a stronger understanding of how international organ-
isations and, in particular, field-based personnel reinforced nation-state hegemony as a geopoliti-
cal formation during a period in which ideas about sovereignty were being renegotiated by a range
of older and emerging global powers. Mediatory conceptions of stability, peace and ‘successful’
political settlement in Cyprus were framed by UN staff’s liberal internationalist visions of
geopolitics and statehood, at the expense of the political identity of ethnic, religious or communal
minority groups and to the advantage of nation-state leadership. Thus, in the aftermath of the
Plaza report, UN peacekeepers helped to re-entrench an uneven distribution of sovereignty in
post-colonial Cyprus and legitimise hierarchies of power between stronger and weaker, larger
and smaller, well-resourced and poorly resourced nations in future negotiations.
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